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FORTHCOMING IN ECONOMIC INQUIRY 
 
 
ABSTRACT. We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice 
that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between the implications 
of forward-looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state 
dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. 
Consistent with previous studies as well as theoretical predictions, we find that subjects’ compliance 
rates increase with greater enforcement, especially the audit rate. We also find more novel results, 
both theoretically and empirically: fine rates should be increased after an audit to discourage 
otherwise-increased underreporting, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant 
rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
How should government design policies to improve tax compliance? Most answers to this 
question are based upon, or at least consistent with, the standard economics-of-crime model first 
applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which assumes myopic and static 
behavior on the part of an individual who balances the expected costs of detected cheating with the 
expected benefits of successful cheating. Most answers also require estimating the impact of various 
policy tools on individual compliance decisions, a task made challenging by the absence of detailed 
and reliable information on individual compliance choices. By its very nature, people have an 
incentive to hide information on their evasion behavior, and this concealment makes empirical work 
quite difficult. In the United States, researchers have found increasingly creative ways to estimate the 
factors that motivate compliance by using naturally occurring field data (including administrative 
data), controlled field experiments, and laboratory experiments. These same empirical approaches 
have sometimes been applied elsewhere as well, but the extent of empirical work in other countries 
is far more limited.1 
In this paper, we first develop a dynamic theoretical model of the individual compliance 
decision that makes it possible to identify “audit state dependent” compliance, in which an 
individual’s compliance decision in the current period depends on the individual’s previous audit 
history from earlier periods.2 Our theoretical model distinguishes between compliance conditional on 
no previous audits and compliance conditional on previous audits, which makes it possible to 
discriminate in our empirical analysis among three types of behavior: forward-looking versus myopic 
versus naïve behaviors. A forward-looking taxpayer takes into account how current compliance 
choices affect future exposure to enforcement policies. One who is myopic is concerned only with 
                                                     
1 For a recent and comprehensive survey of the tax compliance literature, see Alm (2019). For earlier discussions of 
much of this work, see Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Kirchler 
(2007), Alm (2012), and Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam (2013). 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the suggestion that we emphasize more explicitly an individual’s audit 
history in our discussion of the dynamic theoretical model. 
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instantaneous utility, but takes account of accumulated unreported income from earlier compliance 
decisions. A naïve taxpayer looks only at instantaneous utility; also this taxpayer “isolates” the 
current reporting decision and ignores any accumulated unreported income from earlier compliance 
decisions, as suggested by the isolation hypothesis of behavioral economics. Previous work applying 
static models to data analysis has not been able to identify either audit state dependent compliance or 
the impact of changes in audit rates on these three different types of decision-makers. 
We then report the results of the first experiment to examine taxpayer compliance decisions 
in Colombia. The experiment includes treatments that incorporate changes in the full range of fiscal 
parameters (e.g., audit rates, fine rates, and tax rates), as well as a treatment in which tax revenue is 
donated to a charity (similarly to contributions to public good in other tax evasion experiments). The 
subject pool includes full-time students, part-time students, workers, and unemployed individuals, 
which makes it possible to examine subject pool effects. With these experimental data, in combination 
with our theoretical model, we are able to estimate for the first time the determinants of audit state 
dependent taxpayer compliance behavior, and to do so for a country (Colombia) with no previous 
history of experimental studies of tax compliance. The similarity of our experimental design to the 
tax compliance enforcement in most countries, as well as to the designs in many previous 
experimental studies raises the possibility that application of our dynamic model to data, rather 
than the usual static model applied in much of the literature, could lead to different conclusions 
about taxpayer responses to policy innovations.  
Colombia has a long and rich tradition of sophisticated tax policy analyses and tax reforms, 
going back to several studies in the 1960s (Taylor and Richman, 1965; Bird, 1970; Gillis, 1971), 
continuing into the 21st century (Bird, Poterba, and Slemrod, 2005), and extending to the tax reform 
recently enacted by the Government of Colombia in December 2016. Such reforms can be informed 
by estimates of taxpayer compliance behavioral responses to policy innovations, estimates that would 
make any tax reform efforts more meaningful. We provide these estimates here.  
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There are of course reasons for caution in attempting to use our results to explain behavior 
outside the laboratory. Even so, the laboratory offers an opportunity to investigate in a controlled 
environment individual responses to audit, fine, and tax rate changes, as well as to other policies for 
which field data do not readily exist, while controlling for economic and demographic characteristics 
of the responders. Further, unlike much empirical work that relies on imperfect proxies for evasion, 
the measures that we use from the laboratory are accurate and unambiguous measures of individual 
noncompliance, derived in a setting that controls explicitly for extraneous influences on individual 
behavior.  
Not surprisingly, we find that reported income increases with an increase in enforcement, 
especially the audit rate. However, we also find the reported income decreases following the event of 
an audit. Previous work applying static modeling has not been able to examine such distinctions, and 
concluded simply that taxpayer reporting increases with the audit probability. We explain why such 
audit state dependent compliance has new implications for tax policy design. We also find some 
evidence that taxpayer reporting is greater when payments are donated to a charity. Finally, we 
estimate the effects of all of these fiscal variables on two other variables of interest, tax revenues and 
earned income. In all of our results, we see no evidence of differences in behavior between subject 
types, regardless of whether they are students, workers, or unemployed.  
Our paper makes several contributions. Our theoretical model of audit state dependent 
compliance is the first to differentiate between myopic, forward-looking, and naïve behavior. Unlike 
experimental papers with static theory but sequential subject responses, the dynamic theoretical model 
that we apply in our data analysis is consistent with the sequential choices in our experimental design. 
Finally, this paper is the first to use experimental methods to examine compliance behavior in 
Colombia, and to use these data to examine subject pool effects there. 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
We present here a discussion of the dynamic theoretical model that is further developed in 
Appendix 1. 
A. Modeling Tax Compliance Behavior 
Consider an individual who earns income w  and must choose the proportion  to report to 
the tax authorities. At time of the decision, let the cumulative amount of unreported income from 
previous time periods be . The individual pays taxes at tax rate  on each peso of reported income. 
Unreported income is not taxed, but the individual may be audited with a fixed audit rate p  at which 
point the individual must pay taxes on unreported income [ (1 ) ]x R w   plus pay a fine at rate on 
each peso of previously-unpaid taxes.3  
Without any loss of generality, write accumulated unreported income as a multiple of 
current income, x zw  to simplify notation. The instantaneous expected utility of the taxpayer 
from reporting R is 4  
 
EU (R, z)  pU (p1(R, z)) (1 p)U (p 0(R, z))
where
p s(R,z)  w[1t R  st (1 f )(z 1 R)]; s 
0, if not audited
1, if audited
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
   (1) 
A.1. A Forward-looking Decision-maker. A “forward-looking” agent takes into account how 
current compliance choices affect future exposure to audits and fines, in addition to any 
accumulated unreported income. To allow for a dynamic process of individual choice, we denote 
the time-variant variables with a subscript t for the period. In each period t, the individual earns 
                                                     
3 Note that we assume that the fine is assessed on previously unpaid taxes, as in Yitzhaki (1974), rather than on 
unreported income, as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972).  
4 Again, for simplicity we do not here introduce a public good that is financed by individual tax payments, although a 
public good is included in the model in Appendix 1.  
 R
 x t
 f
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income w  and must choose the fraction  to report.5 The individual plays the game that continues 
with probability  (0,1) .6 The decision problem for a forward-looking individual is  
0 [0,1] 0
1 1 2 2
( ) max ( [ ( ( , ))]
(1 (1 )); (1 )
t
t
s t tR t
t t t t t
V z E U R Z
Z X R X R X Bernoulli p
  p

 
   
 
    


  `    (2)  
where tX  takes value 1 if not audited and 0 if audited at time t. We use state 00 to refer to the 
case where the individual is not audited in either of the two previous periods, state 1 to refer to 
the case when the individual is audited in the last period, and state 10 otherwise. At the time (t) 
of decision, the individual knows whether he was audited or not, so he knows the realization of 
Zt. The Bellman equation in state 00 is 
 1[0,1]
1 1
( ) max ( , ) (0) (1 ) ( ) ,
2
t
t t t tR
t t t
V z EU R z pV p V z t
z R R
   
 
        
  
    (3) 
Optimal compliance rates are determined as solutions to the following optimality conditions (Euler 
equations, derived in Appendix 1)  
 
   p p  p p        1 0 1 1 0 1'( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) ,t t t tpfU p U p pU p U t   (4) 
  
where 1 1 ( ( ), )), , 1.ds s s sR z z s t tp p     
In the neighborhood of the steady state ( , ),o oz R  the marginal effects of parameters of 
interest on optimal compliance rates ( )dt tR h z are derived using first order Taylor approximations 
at the steady state ( , )o oz R , or 
  ( ) ( ) '( )( )o o ot th z h z h z z z         (5) 
                                                     
5 For simplicity, income w is assumed to be constant over time in the theoretical derivation. Our experimental design 
allows income to vary, and this variation is included in the empirical estimation. 
6  The parameter  captures various scenarios. If the stochastic game terminates with probability  q and the 
individual’s discount factor is b , then    b(1q). If the game is played infinitely times but the individual discounts 
future payoffs, then   is the discount factor. In our experiment,   captures the subject’s belief of the likelihood that 
the experiment continues. 
 Rt
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We show in Appendix 1.B that in state 00: '( ) (0,1)oh z , there can be no more than one steady 
state, and the steady state compliance rate oR  is implicitly determined by  
p  p  '( ( ,2 2 )) '( ( )) 0o o oU R R U R         (6) 
where 

         
1 1 (1 )1 0
(1 )
p
p f p
.  
As further demonstrated in Appendix 1.B, the compliance rate after an audit is smaller than the 
steady state compliance rate in state 00 and the state 00 optimal compliance rate at time t 
(1) increases with the fine rate; 
(2) increases with the audit rate; 
(3) increases with the tax rate; 
(4) increases with income for CARA and IARA preferences; 
(5) increases with probability of continuation of the game (or patience); and  
(6) increases with the accumulated unreported income rate 
 
A.2. A Myopic Decision-maker. A “myopic” model that incorporates only instantaneous utility (1) 
might be a good model for some taxpayers and for some experimental subjects. As discussed in 
Appendix 1.C for a myopic decision-maker, the signs of the marginal effects of the main determinants 
(e.g., accumulated unreported income rate; fine rate; audit rate; tax rate; and income) are the same as 
for a forward-looking decision-maker. However, in comparison to a forward-looking decision-maker, 
the optimal compliance rates  Rt
m  of a myopic decision-maker do not depend on the probability of 
continuation of the game and they also do not stabilize at an (interior) steady state. An implication of 
the former is oscillating patterns of compliance rates for a myopic decision-maker, as illustrated 
below in subsection II.B.1.  
A.3. A Naïve Decision-maker. In the light of research in behavioral economics, we also look at a 
naïve decision-maker who maximizes instantaneous utility (1) but, unlike a myopic decision-maker, 
“isolates” individual decisions7 and ignores any accumulated unreported income that is a consequence 
                                                     
7 The “isolation hypothesis” was first stated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and subsequently it has become a 
recognized feature in behavioral economics.  
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of earlier compliance decisions. The sign of the marginal effects of the exogenous determinants (e.g., 
fine rate, tax rate, audit rate, and income) are the same as for the myopic model. However, in 
comparison to a myopic decision-maker, compliance rates of a naïve decision-maker at accumulated 
unreported income z do not depend on the accumulated unreported income rate. 
B. Illustrative Examples of Compliance in the Experiment 
 
In our experiment, an audited individual is responsible for current unreported income as 
well as for the unreported income during the two most recent periods. This is a simplified 
representation of government auditing practices in which taxpayers found to be underreporting in 
the current period may be subject to audits that examine previous years of reporting.8  
B.1. Myopic Behavior. The dynamic model points to the cost of myopic decision-making. A 
myopic individual makes choices that at the interior satisfy optimality condition for problem (1) 
 p p  '( ( , )) (1 ) '( ( )) 0t t tpfU R z p U R        (7)  
Because unreported income at time t will be included in accumulated unreported income at time 
t+1 if the individual is not audited, the optimal compliance rate (in state 00) is expected to oscillate 
with t for myopic decision-making. However, by concavity of ( )U   the individual is better off 
reporting the same intermediate level of income in all rounds if he is not audited. We use CARA 
preferences to provide an example that illustrates this property.  
 Consider a myopic decision-maker with CARA preferences and absolute risk aversion, 
 l >0 , represented by  U (p )  (1 e
lp ) / l.  By equation (7) the optimal compliance rate is 
 max{0,min{R
*(z),1}}  where  
                                                     
8 See Rickard, Russell, and Howroyd (1982) for theoretical analysis of this “conditional back audit” rule. Also, see 
Greenberg (1984) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) for theoretical analyses of a “conditional future audit” rule, 
in which detection of underreporting in the current period leads to audits in future periods. Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee 
(1993) use laboratory methods to examine these types of endogenous audit selection rules, and they find that 
endogenous audit selection rules are far more effective than random audit selection rules in deterring noncompliance.  
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R*(z)  z 1 1
lw(1 f )t
ln(1 p
pf
)           (8)  
Let a  denote the last term (the expression after the minus sign), or 1 1ln( ).
(1 )
pa
w f pfl t


 
Suppose that  a(0,1).
9 At the beginning of the game, or having just been audited (state 1), the 
accumulated unreported income is 0 and therefore the optimal compliance rate is  1a. In the 
round after, if the individual is audited (the state is 1), then z 0  so he will again report  1a. If 
he is not audited (the state becomes 10), then  z  a(1(1a)) , and, by the optimality 
condition (9), his compliance rate is 1. Again, if he is audited (the state is 1), he goes back to 
compliance rate  1a. However, if he is not audited (i.e., state 00), his unreported income 
remains  a(2(1a)1) , so it is optimal for him to report 1 again, after which he goes back to 
report  1a (audited or not). Summarizing, the pattern of compliance rate is therefore 
 (1 a,1,1,1 a,1,1,1 a,1,1...). Given that [0,1]R , the patterns of compliance depend on the 
value of a (i.e., risk attitudes and fiscal parameters) and are as follows:  
Case 1:  a0.The compliance rate is 1, always. 
Case 2:  a(0,1).  The compliance rate is 1 a followed by 1 twice, or 
 (1 a,1,1,1 a,1,1,1 a,1,1,1 a,...) . 
Case 3:  1a2 . The compliance rate alternates between 0, 2-a, and 1, or
 (0,2 a,1,0,2 a,1,0,2 a,1,0...) . 
Case 4:  a>2. The compliance rate is 0, always. 
B.2. Numerical Illustration. For CARA preferences with w=240 and 0.026,l   we find that it is 
optimal for the myopic individual to alternate between reporting a fraction of income 0.10 followed 
by full compliance for two subsequent rounds when in state 00. Such a pattern of compliance for 
                                                     
9 This assumption is relaxed below. 
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myopic decision-making generates a sequence of expected utilities that alternate between 38.36 
with a frequency of 1 and 37.90 with a frequency of 2. In this example, our individual’s optimal 
compliance following two rounds of full compliance is the same as his optimal compliance 
following an audit. In contrast, the round expected utility from reporting, say, a constant fraction 
0.76 of income is 38.13 (assuming that the state remains 00). It is straightforward to show that the 
stream of tax revenue from reporting a constant 0.76 fraction of income is also greater than the 
revenue stream from the reporting sequence {0.1, 1, 1}.  
 These results suggest that policies that remind taxpayers how current compliance choices 
affect future exposure to enforcement policies could nudge myopic individuals toward reporting 
more like forward-looking taxpayers, which would benefit the individual while also increasing tax 
revenue.  
C. Some Testable Implications 
 The optimal fraction of income Rt that an individual chooses to report in period t depends 
upon [p, f, τ, w, zt], of which the fiscal parameters are the audit rate p, the fine rate f, and the tax rate 
τ. This function can be written generically as Rt=ϕ(p, f, τ, w, zt).10 Stated as hypotheses, the main 
theoretical implications for our experiment are as follows:  
H1: For any given state of the world, an individual’s compliance rate is higher (lower) with 
a higher (lower) audit, fine, or tax rate. 
 
H2: An individual’s compliance rate is lower immediately following an audit than in state 
00 (where the individual is not audited in either of the two previous periods). 
 
H3: An individual’s compliance rate is higher the larger is accumulated unreported income 
rate.  
 
The next section discusses our experimental design. 
 
 
                                                     
10 As robustness checks, we use alternative specifications for ( )   in our empirical work. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. General Design Features 
Our experimental setting implements the fundamental elements of the voluntary reporting 
systems of Colombia’s individual income tax, as well as of Colombia’s social insurance program. 
Participants earn income, and they must choose how much income to report to the tax authority. 
The participant pays taxes on reported income but not on unreported income. However, the 
individual faces a fixed probability of audit. If the individual is audited, then any unreported 
income in the current period and in the previous two periods is discovered, and the individual must 
pay taxes on all unreported income and a fine on previously unpaid taxes.11 Subjects are fully and 
accurately informed about the various features of the tax rate, audit rate, and fine rate used in their 
experimental session.  
Participants were all adults, recruited from several major Colombian universities, from 
Colombian workers (both employed and self-employed), and from the unemployed. 12  No 
participant had prior experience in this experimental setting. Methods adhere to all guidelines 
concerning the ethical treatment of human subjects.13 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were reminded they had been recruited for two 
hours and then were assigned to a computer station with each station being situated in an isolation 
                                                     
11 Note that the experimental and theoretical models are aligned on the feature that audits apply to the current and two 
previous rounds. This design feature was chosen to implement, in a simple, clear, and understandable way, tax return 
audit practice in which a single-year audit is often extended to include more than one year’s return if underreporting 
is first detected. This is the common practice in Colombia, as well as world-wide. However, actual audit practices can 
be very complicated. For example, in the United States the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) typically has three years 
to audit returns after they are filed. If even modest underreporting is found in one return, then the IRS will often audit 
returns from the two preceding years; if underreporting has been found to exceed 25 percent, the audit can go back six 
or even more years; and if there is evidence of fraud, there is no limit to the number of years the IRS can go back. 
12 Subjects were recruited with flyers posted in universities and government agencies and also through social networks 
(e.g., Facebook). Interested individuals registered online in a Google format, which required them to report his or her 
personal information; over 300 individuals registered online. Participating subjects were then selected randomly from 
the registered individuals. 
13 All Colombian subjects provided written consent for their participation in the laboratory experiment, and the 
Institutional Review Board at Georgia State University approved the analysis of the experimental data. 
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carrel. The experimental laboratory consisted of networked computers, a server, and software 
designed for this series of experiments. Basic instructions were provided via a hardcopy and also 
via a series of screen images; a representative set of instructions is provided in Appendix 3. There 
was no interaction between the participants and the person running the experiment beyond the 
initial seating of the participants at terminals and the reading of the consent document. Decisions 
were made privately, and participants were not allowed to talk with one another during the session. 
Participants were informed that all responses were anonymous, that no individual identification 
would be collected, and that the only record of participation would be the receipt signed to receive 
payment at the end of the session. Participants were also told that payments would be made in 
private at the end of the session. Taken together, these experimental procedures effectively 
eliminate both subject-to-subject interaction and subject-to-experimenter interaction. 
The detailed steps of the experiment can be briefly described. At the beginning of the 
session, a participant received an endowment of 500 experimental coins, equivalent to 5000 
Colombian pesos. Then at the beginning of each round of the session, participants were presented 
with a simple task that required them to add numbers; their performance on this task determined 
their earned income. Subjects were then presented with a screen that provided the details of the 
treatment in effect. They were informed with certainty of the tax rate, the audit rate, and the fine 
rate. Each subject then chose the amount of income to report to the tax authority. The computer 
automatically calculated the resulting tax liability. Participants were able to experiment with 
different reports during the time allowed for filing, and they could observe the potential changes 
in their reported take home income.  
The process of determining who among the filers is audited was generated by a 
computerized draw. After each subject reports income, the participant is presented on his or her 
computer screen with an animated (computerized) representation of a bucket from which a draw 
is made. In this bucket there is a fixed number of balls (either blue or white), with a white ball 
13 
 
signifying no audit, a blue ball denoting an audit, and the number of blue balls relative to the 
number of white balls determining the audit rate. Each taxpayer is audited independently. The balls 
“bounce” in this bucket, and then a door opens and a ball exits the bucket through this door, with 
the color of the ball indicating whether the individual is audited. The audit applies to the current 
period declarations of taxable income and to the two previous periods. The computer automatically 
deducts taxes paid and penalties (if any are owed) from each audited participant’s account. After 
the audit process has been completed, each subject is presented with a new screen that provides 
the earnings and audit outcome summary for the round. 
Our experimental setting was very contextual in order to promote “parallelism” to the 
naturally occurring world (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1987). Our experimental interface and instructions 
used tax language throughout; the participants decided how much income to report in the same 
manner as on the typical tax form (e.g., entering income on a tax form). There was a time limit on 
the subjects in making the reporting decision. Of some importance, the main policy parameters 
(e.g., the tax, audit, and fine rates) were set in their baseline values to be in alignment with actual 
values in Colombia.14 For example, the individual income tax rate in Colombia has ranged up to 
39 percent in recent years, with an average of about 30 percent, and the baseline value of the tax 
rate in the experiment was set at 30 percent. Similarly, the fine rate on unreported taxes in 
Colombia is 60 percent (plus payment of unreported taxes), and the baseline fine rate in the 
experiment was set at 60 percent. The “audit coverage” (defined as audit actions/total audits) has 
varied from about 5 percent to 30 percent since around 2000, and the baseline audit rate in the 
experiment was set at 10 percent. The actual audit rate over this period was somewhat lower, 
between 1 and 3 percent (Vazquez-Caro and Slemrod, 2005), and in one of the experimental 
                                                     
14 For details of the current Colombian income tax regime, see https://www.dian.gov.co/ . See Vazquez-Caro and 
Slemrod (2005) for a somewhat dated if still relevant discussion of Colombian tax administration procedures. 
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treatments the audit rate was set at 1 percent. The policy parameters varied across treatments, as 
discussed below. 
Participants were not told the exact duration of the experimental session, which was 
predetermined to last for 20 real rounds. They had been told they were recruited for a session that 
could last at most two hours. Including instructions, 3 practice rounds, and the 20 real rounds, 
sessions actually took on average 70 minutes to complete. Each subject’s payoff was realized at 
the end of each round, and each subject was paid the sum of payoffs in all 20 real rounds at the 
end of the experiment. Each session had either 15 or 16 subjects. In all, 122 subjects participated 
in these sessions, from a sample pool of over 300 potential participants. Salient payoffs averaged 
35,390 Colombian pesos (about $17), which is more than 10 times the minimum hourly wage in 
effect at the time of the experiment. 
B. Experimental Treatments 
Recall that our main objective is to estimate the impact of independent changes in the main 
fiscal parameters (p, f, τ) on individual compliance choices. We do this by conducting treatments 
that differ from the baseline only in the value of a single fiscal parameter. In addition, we conduct 
one session in which the subjects’ total tax payments are aggregated and donated to a Colombian 
nonprofit organization, Fundación Cardioinfantil, a medical institution that helps children with 
heart disease. This session is designed to examine the impact of public good provision on tax 
compliance decisions.15 Table 1 summarizes the experimental treatments. 
                                                     
15 There are various ways of introducing a public good in tax evasion experiments. An obvious way mimics standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism experiments, in which the taxes (or contributions) of all subjects are combined, 
increased by some multiple, and distributed to subjects in equal amounts; see Ledyard (1995) and Janssen and Ahn 
(2006) for comprehensive surveys of public good experiments. The same mechanism can be used in tax compliance 
experiments. For example, see Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking (1987), Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), and 
Fochmann and Kroll (2016) for examples of this mechanism in tax compliance experiments; see Alm and Jacobson 
(2007) for a survey of this work. Another way that attempts to achieve more parallelism between subjects and the 
naturally occurring world is to make the public good a real-world charity, in which subject taxes are distributed to the 
charity. See Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1993) and Christian and Alm (2014) for examples of this approach. Using a 
real-world charity has also been used in other laboratory experiments, such as dictator game experiments (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996). Note that there is a large literature that uses real-world charities in laboratory and field experiments 
on charitable giving. For a recent prominent example, see Filiz-Ozbay and Uler (forthcoming).  
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  <Table 1 about here> 
To establish a baseline, Treatment 1 (T1) sets the three fiscal parameters at baseline levels: 
p=10 percent, f=60 percent, and τ=30 percent. Note that a 60 percent fine rate means that the 
audited individual must pay unreported taxes plus an additional fine of 60 percent, so that the 
“effective” fine rate is 1.60. The other treatments differ by a single parameter while holding 
constant the others at their baseline values. In Treatment 2 (T2), the fine rate is increased to 120 
percent (or an effective fine rate of 2.20); in Treatment 3 (T3), the fine rate is lowered to 30 percent 
(or an effective fine rate of 1.30). In Treatments 4 and 5, the tax rate is varied, increasing to 45 
percent in T4 and decreasing to 10 percent in T5. In Treatments 6 and 7, the audit rate is varied, to 
20 percent in T6 and to 1 percent in T7. Finally, Treatment 8 (T8) sets the fiscal parameters at their 
baseline (T1) levels, but donates all subjects’ taxes to the nonprofit organization. 
C. Expected Value Calculations  
A risk-neutral individual will make choices so as to maximize the expected value of the 
compliance gamble. Accordingly, it is useful to calculate the expected value in the treatments. 
These calculations also provide support for the hypotheses from the earlier discussion. 
For example, in the baseline session (T1), the expected value EV equals 0.7w when the 
individual reports fully and honestly (or R=100 percent). In contrast, the expected value from 
reporting zero income is 0.87w.16 In the baseline session, the optimal risk neutral strategy is 
therefore to report zero income. More generally, optimal individual decisions for any linear payoff 
function will tend to exhibit all-or-none behavior; only very large changes in parameter values alter 
                                                     
16 To illustrate this calculation, recall that the effective fine rate is 1.60 (=1+0.60) because the individual must pay 
unreported taxes plus a fine of 60 percent. In state 1, expected income is 0.952w because the individual pays taxes 
plus a fine on w if audited; in state 10 expected income is 0.904w because the individual pays taxes plus a fine on 2w 
if audited; in state 00 expected income is 0.856w because the individual pays taxes plus a fine on 3w if audited. The 
expected value of strategy “always report 0 income” is 0.87w as our tax game is an ergodic Markov chain with steady-
state probabilities 0.1 (state 1), 0.09 (state 10) and 0.81 (state 00).  
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this outcome. As we demonstrate below, our experimental results are largely consistent with all-or-
none behavior. They are also largely consistent with lower compliance following an audit. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Aggregate Data  
Table 2 shows the main summary statistics for compliance in each of the eight treatments. 
The overall mean Compliance Rate (calculated as the ratio of reported income to earned income) 
is 72.0 percent. The overall median Compliance Rate is 86.0 percent. Six subjects reported zero 
income in every round, and 30 subjects reported full income in every round. Full and zero 
compliance account for 57.8 percent and 17.5 percent of 2437 observations, respectively.  
  <Table 2 about here> 
Following an audit, full compliance decreases to 49.5 percent while zero compliance increases to 
22.2 percent. The demographic characteristics of the subjects are reported in Table 3, including 
dummy variables for whether the subject was Born in Bogota, Lives in Bogota, lives with a Parent 
Household Head, Owns a House, is a Full-time Student, and is a Female; asterisks denote 
significant differences in the variable across treatments, with Treatment 1 (T1) the baseline 
comparison.  
  <Table 3 about here> 
B. Tobit Estimates with Individual Data 
We look at individual data to test for the effects of variations in the experimental 
parameters. The individual data also allow us to examine the impact of demographic 
characteristics, including subject pool effects.  
The common empirical approach used with data like ours involves estimation of a Tobit 
model because of bounds on the dependent variable, and we utilize this Tobit approach in several 
specifications. Table 4 presents Tobit regressions with random effects with an upper bound at 1 
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and a lower bound at 0 for the dependent variable, the observed Compliance Rate (defined as 
Reported Income/True Earned Income) for each individual in each round of the treatment; standard 
errors are calculated using bootstrap methods. Estimates reported in the left-most three columns 
use data from all 122 subjects. Estimates for 86 subjects reported in the right-most three columns 
do not include data from 36 subjects who either reported 0 or full income in every round, since 
responses to any changes in the environment are less informative for individuals who do not 
change their behavior. 
  <Table 4 about here> 
Based upon the estimation results in Table 4, the impacts of the policy parameters are partly 
consistent with the theoretical implications summarized in hypothesis H1. A higher fine rate has a 
weakly significant effect on increasing the compliance rate for the 86 subjects choosing in the 
interior. A higher audit rate has a strongly significant effect in increasing compliance in tests 
reported in all columns. Calculating elasticities at the baseline treatment values for the policy 
parameters (audit rate=0.1, fine rate=0.6, and tax rate=0.3) and at means of the other variables 
(Accumulated Unreported Income Rate, Income, Round), the fine rate has a significant effect on 
compliance (using the results for 86 subjects), with an estimated elasticity of 0.41. For the audit 
rate, the estimated elasticities are 0.66 (for all subjects) and 0.51 (for 86 subjects), which are 
consistent with most other empirical estimates derived either from field data or laboratory data 
(Alm, 2019). The tax rate estimate is not statistically different from 0 in any specification, and 
Income is also not statistically significant.17 Of some note, the use of the tax payments (Donation) 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on compliance for the full sample of 122 subjects.  
                                                     
17 It is not uncommon to find little or no impact of the amount of income on the compliance rate. See Alm and 
Malézieux (2019) for a meta-analysis of laboratory experiments on the impact of income (and other variables) on 
optimal compliance rates. 
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The dummy variable for Audited Last Round has a highly significant negative coefficient: 
the compliance rate is estimated to decrease by more than 32 percent following an audit event. The 
observed decrease in compliance after an audit is a result predicted by the dynamic model and 
stated in hypothesis H2. Note that our empirical finding is consistent with the so-called “bomb-
crater effect”, in which an audited individual reduces his or her immediate post-audit compliance 
before recovering somewhat in succeeding rounds. This effect is often found in laboratory 
experiments (Mittone, 2006; Maciejovsky, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger, 2007; Kastlunger et 
al., 2009), although previous experimental studies that observed the bomb-crater effect did not 
provide a theoretical explanation as we do here. Results reported in field studies are mixed: 
Mendoza, Wielhouwer, and Kirchler (2017) report bomb crater effects while Erard (1992) and 
Advani, Elming, and Shaw (2015) report the opposite. Weak bomb crater effects in field data are 
consistent with the theoretical model of naive decision-making in subsection II.A.3. They also 
could reflect taxpayers’ belief that taxpayer-specific audit probability increases after a previous 
audit detects underreporting, whereas audit probability is typically held constant in an experiment. 
The possible implications of (weak or strong) bomb crater effects for tax policy are discussed in 
section V.  
As reported in Table 4, demographic variables are largely insignificant, including dummy 
variables for whether the subject is Born in Bogota, is a Full-Time Student, owns a home (Own 
House), lives with a Parent Household Head, lives in Bogota (Lives in Bogota). Importantly, we 
find no evidence of subject pool effects; that is, there is no significant difference in behavior 
between students and other demographic groups, consistent with the results of Alm, Bloomquist, 
and McKee (2015). Female subjects seem more compliant than male subjects, a result that has 
generally been found in other laboratory experiments (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992).  
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The positive estimated coefficient of Accumulated Unreported Income Rate is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction stated in hypothesis H3.18 The estimated elasticity for the basic 
model is 0.07 for all subjects and slightly larger 0.12 for selected subjects, indicating in both cases 
relatively inelastic compliance rates. We find no wealth effect from Accumulated Payoff, which is 
consistent with other experimental papers that accumulate payoff after each decision.19 Negative 
Round effects are expected for the dynamic model with t  decreasing with t, but no effects are 
expected either for the myopic model or for the dynamic model with fixed   (given that subjects 
did not know that the last round was round 20). While we see a significant negative estimate for 
the Round variable, the effect disappears when demographics are added. 
C. Robustness Tests (1): Tobit Estimates with Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual 
Level 
 
A potential concern with the estimates in Table 4 is that the observations are not 
independently drawn; that is, although each subject went through 20 rounds of decisions in a given 
treatment, these rounds are not independent from one another. To examine this issue, we estimate 
the basic specifications reported in Table 4 but use robust standard errors clustered at the individual 
level. Our main results are unaffected.20 
D. Robustness Tests (2): Hurdle Estimates of Individual Data 
As suggested by Cragg (1971), it is possible to examine the individual as making two 
related but distinct compliance decisions: the first is the decision on whether to report all or some 
of the true earned income, and the second is the decision on how much of true earned income to 
                                                     
18 We thank a reviewer for raising a potential issue of endogeneity of Accumulated Unreported Income Rate during 
the previous two rounds and suggesting exogenous variation of task difficulty as an instrument. We defined Task 
Difficulty as the minimum earned income by any subject in a given round across all treatments. The first stage (random 
effects) GLS estimate of Task Difficulty is -0.146 (significant at 1%). The second stage (random effects) Tobit 
regression produces estimated coefficients that are essentially the same as the ones reported in Table 4. 
19 Previous papers that used this “pay all sequentially” protocol and that performed careful analyses for possible wealth 
effects also found none that were significant (Cox and Epstein, 1989; Cox and Grether, 1996; Cox, Sadiraj, and 
Schmidt, 2015). 
20 These results are unreported but are available upon request. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting 
this estimation. 
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report (conditional upon reporting some income). We also estimate this “hurdle” model of Cragg 
(1971) as an alternative to the Tobit results in Table 4. These results are reported and discussed in 
detail in Appendix 2. The hurdle results are largely consistent with the Tobit results. 
E. Empirical Validity of Myopic Behavior 
As discussed in subsection II.B.1, compliance rates of a myopic individual would vary 
between lower and higher values in a periodic way, while a flat pattern is predicted for a forward-
looking individual. As discussed in section II.A.2 and II.B.1, the compliance rates do not depend 
on the continuation of the game, so they do not directly depend on the time period. To get some 
insights on myopic behavior we look closely at individual data. Approach 1 focuses on consistency 
of “lambda” (risk attitudes, section II.B.1) while Approach 2 looks at alternating patterns.  
E.1. Approach 1. We created a new variable, ln((1 ) / )
( 1 ) (1 )t t t t
p pf
z R w f
l
t

  
 , using the optimal R*(z) 
specification (8) discussed earlier. This variable is undefined when full income is reported and 
accumulated unreported income is 0, or when 0tz   and 1tR  . There are 73 (out of 122) subjects 
with a well-defined tl  for at least 50 percent of the rounds. For a myopic decision-maker, tl  does 
not vary with t, and we selected round 12 for our testing. For a myopic subject i, the null hypothesis 
is that 12
i i
tl l . If the t-test fails (at 10% significance level) to reject the null hypothesis, then the 
subject is classified as myopic. By this criterion, 37 percent of the subjects (or 27 out of 73) are 
classified as myopic decision-makers.  
E.2. Approach 2. For each subject, we created a new variable defined as the difference in the 
compliance rate ( )dcr  of a subject’s observed choices in two subsequent rounds when in state 00. 
For periodic compliance rates, the values of the difference variable are positive, 0, or negative. For 
each subject, we then conducted a t-test on the absolute value of the difference variable (| |).dcr  If 
the t-test does not reject the hypothesis that the mean of | |dcr  is larger than 0.1, then we classified 
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the subject as “myopic”. Using this criterion, we find that more than 35 percent (or 43 out of 122) 
of the subjects’ compliance patterns in state 00 reveal myopic behavior.21 The percentage figure 
increases to 50 percent (43 subjects out of 86) if we do not include 36 subjects whose compliance 
rate was the same for all 20 rounds.22 A subject who reported full (or 0) income in all 20 rounds 
will not be classified as myopic by this criterion. We cannot classify these 36 subjects because a 
very risk averse subject (either myopic or forward-looking) would always fully comply, while a 
risk lover or risk neutral subject (either myopic or forward-looking) would always report zero 
income. The number of subjects classified as myopic by both approaches is 18 percent (13 out of 
73). These results on myopic versus forward-looking behavior are generally similar to other papers 
that explore this behavior in areas other than tax compliance.23 
F. Additional Treatment Effects on Tax Revenues and Earned Income 
We also investigate the effect of treatments on tax revenues and on earned income by 
creating two variables, total tax revenue (TaxRev) and true earned income (I). For any given 
treatment and round, the value of true earned income is the total amount of income earned in that 
round by all subjects in the session. Similarly, TaxRev is the total amount paid in taxes in a given 
treatment and round by all subjects in the session. Note that TaxRev does not include the amount 
paid in penalties (tax plus fine times unreported income) in case the subject is audited. Because 
the Baseline and Higher Tax Rate treatments each had one more subject than the other treatments, 
we divide the values of these two variables by the number of subjects in the session. There are 20 
                                                     
21 In the last column of Table 2 we report the percentages of myopic subjects across treatments. 
22 Compliance rates of a naive individual do not depend either on the accumulated unreported income or on the 
continuation of the game (see II.A.3). For each subject, we created a new variable defined as the difference between 
the upper and lower bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval of the compliance rate of the subject. Classifying a 
subject as naïve if this difference is less than 0.1, the estimated percentage of naïve subjects is 23 percent (or 20 out 
of 86). 
23 For some recent examples, see Hey and Lotito (2009), Hey and Panaccione (2011), Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman 
(2015), all of whom use laboratory experiments to examine different types of behavior and all of whom find substantial 
evidence of myopic players. For example, Hey and Lotito (2009) find that the majority of their subjects are myopic, 
Hey and Panaccione (2011) find that the majority of subjects impose their first period preferences on their future 
choices, and Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman (2015) estimate that 45 percent of the players in their “guessing games” 
are myopic. 
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observations of each variable for each of the 8 treatments, giving 160 total observations. Using 
OLS regression analysis, we estimate the impacts of the tax rate, the fine rate, the audit rate, and 
donations on each of these dependent variables, along with the demographic variable Female in 
an additional specification for each dependent variable. These results are shown in Table 5.  
<Table 5 about here> 
Results in Table 5 indicate that the tax rate has a negative effect on true earned income 
(paid in experimental coins, EC). The estimated tax rate effect is -97EC or -72EC, depending on 
the specification. (True earned income per subject in the Baseline treatment T1 was 235 EC.) The 
estimated elasticity is -0.13 or -0.09, revealing an inelastic income response to the tax rate. The 
effect of the tax rate on tax revenue is positive, with estimates for the marginal effect and the 
elasticity of 136EC and 0.86, respectively for the model with Female dummy variable. Both the 
fine rate and the audit rate have positive effects on true earned income as well as on tax revenues; 
the estimated elasticities are 0.25 for the fine rate and 0.35 for the audit rate.24  
With respect to the Donation treatment (T8), tax revenues per capita are higher when 
subjects are informed that their taxes are being donated to a charity. This is consistent with a 
positive demand for giving to charities. Note that round estimates suggest that subjects get better 
in performing the income-earning task as the experiment proceeds. Also, the larger the fraction of 
females in a session the smaller is true income per capita but the larger is tax revenue. The negative 
income estimate comes from females earning on average less (218EC) than males (240EC). Even 
so, females pay more in taxes (49.86EC versus 47.76EC) because compliance rates for females 
versus males (0.754 for females versus 0.697 for males) are sufficiently large to compensate for 
lower income. 
                                                     
24 We have also estimated an additional specification for tax revenue and true earned income that includes the 
proportion of subjects audited last round. This variable has no significant effect and other results are not affected, so 
we do not report this alternative specification. We find no evidence that occurrence of audits result in lower effort: 
the average earned income is 237EC in the rounds immediately following an audit and 230EC in other rounds.  
 
23 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The significance of changes in fiscal parameters in our experiment differs between effects 
on compliance and effects on basic objectives of tax policy, such as raising revenue with a small 
decrease in income from work effort. We find that increases in the audit rate have highly significant 
and positive effects on the compliance rate, while also increasing revenues and earned income. 
Increases in the fine rate increase revenues and earned income with somewhat variable effects on 
the compliance rate. As expected, increasing the tax rate has highly significant effects on 
increasing revenue but decreasing earned income, while having little impact on the compliance 
rate. Donating tax proceeds to charity has a highly significant positive effect on tax revenue and 
weakly significant positive (or no) effects on compliance.   
  Of perhaps more interest, our dynamic model of compliance predicts an idiosyncratic effect 
of tax return auditing that is supported by the experimental data. This audit state dependent model of 
taxpayer compliance predicts that income reporting decreases right after an audit if the audit 
probability and fine rate are constant over time. Indeed, our experimental results show a highly 
significant negative effect on compliance of having been audited in the last round. This result suggests 
that, in order to counter such a bounce in underreporting, tax authorities may want to consider 
informing taxpayers caught evading that on the next such occasion they will face conditionally higher 
fine rates.  
We are also able to use the dynamic model to distinguish between myopic, forward-looking, 
and naïve behavior in tax compliance. Applying this distinction in analysis of the data, we find that 
about one-third of our subjects are myopic. Compliance rates for myopic individuals in the most likely 
scenario (e.g., no audit for adjacent reporting periods) fluctuate between a high and low fraction of 
income reporting. In contrast, forward-looking behavior requires a nearly constant fraction of income 
reporting. An implication for tax policy is that nudging taxpayers towards forward-looking behavior, 
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by reminding them how their current compliance choices affect their future exposure to audits, 
could benefit both myopic taxpayers and the tax administration.  
There are certainly reasons for caution in the use of and generalization from these estimates. 
They are based upon somewhat artificial laboratory experiments; they are derived from subjects 
whose experience with real-world taxation is uncertain; and they are generated from small samples. 
Still, it seems likely that the results can contribute to understanding of the compliance puzzle, 
especially in a country like Colombia where previous estimates of individual behavioral responses 
simply do not exist. The laboratory experiment provides accurate information on individual 
compliance choices for Colombian subjects. Further, there is much accumulating evidence that 
suggests that the “external validity” of tax compliance experiments is in fact significant (Alm, 
Bloomquist, and McKee, 2015).25  Most importantly, there is now a large literature that argues 
convincingly that experimental methods can contribute significantly to policy debates, as long as 
some conditions are met: the payoffs to subjects are salient; better subject decisions yield higher 
subject payoffs; decision costs are dominated by payoffs; and the experimental setting captures the 
essential properties of the naturally occurring environment that is the subject of investigation (Smith, 
1982; Plott, 1987). These conditions are met here. 
                                                     
25 Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2015) present several types of evidence on the external validity of tax compliance 
experiments. First, they examine whether behavior by laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals 
making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world, by utilizing a special data set assembled by the IRS as part 
of its National Research Program. Second, they also examine whether students behave differently than non-students 
in identical laboratory experiments, by using previously reported data from laboratory experiments that compare the 
decisions of a population of adults with those of undergraduate students, both of whom participate in the identical 
laboratory experiment. Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2015) find that there is an overall similarity between the 
behavior of individual taxpayers in the field and of student subjects making comparable decisions in the laboratory, 
so that data from the laboratory closely align with data from the field; in particular, they find that estimated responses 
of taxpayers in the field and students in the laboratory are quite similar. They also find that student and non-student 
subjects exhibit broadly similar behavior in the laboratory, even though there are some small differences in their 
responses to individual policy treatments. These results confirm that compliance behavior in the laboratory generalizes 
beyond the laboratory. See also Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992) for earlier comparisons of estimated 
responses of subjects in laboratory experiments versus those of real-world taxpayers based on naturally 
occurring field data. See Choo, Fonseca, and Myles (2016) for an alternative view on student versus non-student 
behaviors. 
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How can the Government of Colombia use these results in its ongoing efforts to improve 
compliance? One obvious strategy is consistent with the “Enforcement Paradigm” of Alm and Torgler 
(2011): Increase audits and fines. However, our results also suggest additional strategies, such as 
ensuring that individuals can see the uses to which their taxes are put. These latter strategies are 
consistent with additional and emerging paradigms of tax administration, or the “Trust Paradigm” and 
the “Service Paradigm” (Alm and Torgler, 2011). Other novel and underutilized strategies, such as 
providing information designed to nudge individuals away from myopic decision-making, can also 
be beneficial when tax auditing protocols have dynamic features. In short, the Government of 
Colombia – just like governments elsewhere – should pursue a range of approaches in its efforts to 
promote compliance, approaches that are consistent with the “full house” of behaviors that our results 
demonstrate.  
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TABLE 1 
Experimental Design 
Session Session Name    Tax Rate Fine Rate Audit Rate Donation? 
T1 Baseline 30% 60% 10% No 
T2 Higher Fine Rate 30% 120% 10% No 
T3 Lower Fine Rate 30% 30% 10% No 
T4 Higher Tax Rate 45% 60% 10% No 
T5 Lower Tax Rate 10% 60% 10% No 
T6 Higher Audit Rate 30% 60% 20% No 
T7 Lower Audit Rate 30% 60% 1% No 
T8 Donation of Taxes 30% 60% 10% Yes 
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TABLE 2 
a. Compliance Rates – Summary Statistics by Treatment for All Subjects 
Session Percent Zero 
Compliance 
Obs. 
Percent Full 
Compliance 
Obs. 
Median 
Compliance 
Rate 
Mean 
Compliance 
Rate 
Compliance 
Rate 
Standard 
Deviation 
Nr. of 
Subjects 
Percent 
Myopic 
Subjects 
(Criter. 1)a 
Percent 
Myopic 
Subjects 
(Criter. 2) 
T1 19 57 0.838 0.732 0.310 16 45  44 (58) 
T2 4 63 0.925 0.797 0.251 15 50 33 (38) 
T3 14 46 0.807 0.705 0.339 15 10  40 (55) 
T4 14 66 0.832 0.775 0.257 16 50 50 (67) 
T5 26 62 0.977 0.706 0.392 15 50 20 (43) 
T6 12 63 0.859 0.810 0.200 15 40  40 (55) 
T7 42 30 0.316 0.406 0.375 15 31  27 (33) 
T8 9 75 0.950 0.830 0.242 15 20  27 (50) 
Notes: a There are 73 (out of 122) subjects whose choices are well-defined to apply this criterion. Figures in parenthesis 
in the last column do not include 30 subjects who reported full income always and also do not include 6 subjects who 
always reported 0 income.  
 
b. Compliance Rates – Summary Statistics by Treatment for Partial Compliers 
Session Median 
Compliance Rate 
Mean 
Compliance Rate 
Compliance Rate 
Standard Deviation 
Number of 
subjects 
T1 0.772 0.726 0.250 12 
T2 0.876 0.766 0.256 13 
T3 0.793 0.689 0.292 11 
T4 0.663 0.700 0.256 12 
T5 0.650 0.655 0.321 7 
T6 0.832 0.741 0.191 11 
T7 0.333 0.424 0.341 12 
T8 0.734 0.681 0.250 8 
Notes: 30 subjects who always reported full income and 6 subjects who always reported 0 income are not included. 
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TABLE 3 
Demographic Characteristics of Subjects by Treatment 
 Demographic Characteristic 
(Proportion of Subjects) 
 
Session 
 
Female 
 
Student 
Own 
House 
Parent As 
Household Head 
Lives in 
Bogota 
Born in 
Bogota 
T1 0.563 0.563 0.813 0.938 0.875 0.813 
T2 0.333 0.533 0.600 0.667* 0.867 0.600 
T3 0.533 0.800 0.667 0.733 0.600* 0.600 
T4 0.625 0.375 0.688 0.625** 0.813 0.750 
T5 0.333 0.533 0.667 0.667* 0.733 0.733 
T6 0.333 0.533 0.667 0.733 0.933 0.867 
T7 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.600** 0.600* 0.800 
T8 0.267* 0.667 0.867 0.867 0.733 0.800 
Total 0.418 0.582 0.705 0.730 0.770 0.746 
Notes: The demographic variable in each session is compared to the baseline (T1). p-values reported by the two-
sample test of proportions are used for significance, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4 
Random-effects Tobit Regression Results for Compliance Rate 
Explanatory Variable 
Data from All 122 Subjects Data from 86 Subjects 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Donation [D] 0.950* 0.915** 1.115** 0.126 0.120 0.125 
(0.494) (0.448) (0.500) (0.255) (0.261) (0.355) 
Tax Rate 0.436 0.383 -0.435 0.685 0.592 0.375 
(1.664) (1.748) (2.188) (1.179) (1.242) (1.369) 
Fine Rate 0.542 0.546 0.398 0.581 0.585* 0.568* 
(0.446) (0.449) (0.542) (0.363) (0.299) (0.345) 
Audit Rate 8.311*** 8.285*** 7.785*** 4.355** 4.437** 4.512** 
(2.938) (2.901) (2.841) (1.748) (1.736) (1.764) 
Accumulated Unreported 
Income Rate 
0.229*** 0.175** 0.180** 0.220*** 0.163** 0.168** 
(0.072) (0.083) (0.080) (0.074) (0.083) (0.074) 
Income -0.073 -0.090 -0.089 -0.057 -0.074 -0.075 
(0.055) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
Round -0.019*** -0.017*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) 
Audited Last Round [D]  -0.321*** -0.329***  -0.336*** -0.342*** 
 (0.088) (0.083)  (0.100) (0.084) 
Accumulated Payoff   -0.010   -0.009 
  (0.012)   (0.011) 
Female [D]   0.516*   -0.045 
  (0.304)   (0.171) 
Full-time Student [D]   -0.119   -0.124 
  (0.316)   (0.189) 
Own House   -0.058   -0.049 
  (0.338)   (0.194) 
Parent Household Head [D]   -0.425   0.327 
  (0.483)   (0.304) 
Lives in Bogota [D]   0.561   -0.174 
  (0.518)   (0.273) 
Born in Bogota [D]   -0.415   -0.197 
  (0.442)   (0.277) 
Constant 0.185 0.261 0.677 0.117 0.206 0.428 
(0.696) (0.721) (0.853) (0.507) (0.521) (0.667) 
Observations 2,437 1,717 
Number of Subjects 122 86 
Number of clusters 122 86 
Censored observations (left, 
uncensored, right) (427, 602, 1408) (307, 602, 808) 
Notes: The dependent variable is Compliance Rate (=Reported Income/Full Income), with a lower bound of 0 and an 
upper bound of 1. In “Data from 86 Subjects”, information from 30 subjects who reported full income in every round 
and information from 6 subjects who reported 0 income in every round are not included. The unit of measurement for 
Income (earned points in the current round) as well as Accumulated Payoff (sum of earnings at the beginning of the 
current round) is 100 EC; dummy variables are denoted with [D]; Accumulated Unreported Income Rate is the ratio 
between the total unreported income during the previous two rounds and income in the current round. Bootstrap 
standard errors (clustered at the individual level) are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
  
34 
 
 
TABLE 5 
OLS Estimates of Tax Revenues and True Earned Income 
 
Tax Revenue 
(per capita) 
True Earned Income 
(per capita) 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Donation [D] 9.658*** 14.518*** 1.155 -4.648 
(0.925) (0.126) (2.790) (4.575) 
Tax Rate 156.946*** 135.983*** -96.724*** -71.694** 
(5.128) (0.603) (9.179) (21.653) 
Fine Rate 14.315*** 20.070*** 27.246** 20.375 
(0.919) (0.159) (11.351) (11.554) 
Audit Rate 165.718*** 167.430*** 143.345** 141.300*** 
(25.533) (0.635) (56.305) (26.785) 
Round -0.058 -0.054 1.211*** 1.205*** 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.152) (0.158) 
Female [D]  26.404***  -31.528 
 (0.629)  (28.261) 
Constant -24.173*** -33.454*** 214.769*** 225.851*** 
(3.047) (0.399) (10.197) (11.940) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.894 0.906 0.485 0.499 
Notes: Dummy variables are denoted with [D]. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) are in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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ONLINE APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
A. Donation Effects. If tax payments are used to finance a public good P that benefits others, then 
the utility function is  p( , )P , which is a concave and increasing function of both own income (
p ) and the public good level (P). For a separable specification,  p p( , ) ( ( ), ( ))P f U v P , we have 
that ( (.)) / ( (.)) /V R V U R  >   , and therefore the optimal compliance rate for preferences 
represented by (.)  is larger than for preferences represented by (.).U   
 
B. A Forward-Looking Decision-maker. We show that the optimal (steady state) compliance 
rate in state 00 (where the individual is not audited in either of the two previous periods) for the 
dynamic decision problem in the text: 
(1) increases with the fine rate f   
(2) increases with the audit rate p   
(3) increases with the tax rate t  
(4) increases with income w  for CARA and IARA preferences 
(5) increases with the probability of continuation of the game (or patience)  ; and 
(6) increases with the accumulated unreported income rate z  in the neighborhood of the 
steady state. 
 
Also, the compliance rate after an audit is smaller than the steady state compliance rate in state 00 
(absent audits). 
Proof. To simplify notation, write the accumulated unreported income x  as x zw  and 
(1 )w f t  . We derive the Euler equation, the steady state compliance rates, and the first order 
Taylor approximation for the optimal control rule and use this information to predict signs of the 
estimates in the empirical analysis. 
The decision problem for a forward-looking individual is  
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0 [0,1] 0
1 1 2 2
( ) max ( [ ( ( , ))]
(1 (1 )); (1 )
t
t
s t tR t
t t t t t t
V z E U R Z
Z X R X R X Bernoulli p
  p

 
   
 
    


  `     (A1.1)  
where  ( , ) 1 (1 )(1 ) , {0,1}s R z w R s f R z sp t t       . Since p p0 0( , ) ( ,0)R z R  for all 
accumulated unreported income zw , for simplicity we abuse the notation and write p ( , )R z  when 
referring to p1( , )R z  and p( )R  when referring to p0( , ).R z  The dynamic programming (Bellman) 
equation of problem (A1.1) in state 00 is 
 1[0,1]
1 1
( ) max ( ( , )) (0) (1 ) ( ) ,
2
t
t s t t tR
t t t
V z EU R z pV p V z t
z R R
 p   
 
        
  
       (A1.2)   
Differentiate the expression within the square brackets with respect to tR  and divide by wt to get  
1( ) [ '( ( , )) (1 ) '( ( ))] (1 )(1 ) '( )t t t tG pfU R z p U R p f V z p p             (A1.3)   
where ( , , , , , ).tz p f w t   The (interior) optimal ( )dt tR h z  is implicitly determined by 
( ) 0G   . Differentiate (A1.2) with respect to 1tR   and divide by   to get 
1'( ) '( ( , )) (1 ) '( )
d
t t t tV z pU R z p V z p           (A1.4)   
Write (A1.3) at time t and t+1 and (A1.4) at time 1t  absent an audit to get  
 
 
p p  
p p  
 p  

  
  
      
      
    
1 0 1
1 1 0 1 2
1 1 1 2
'( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 )(1 ) '( )
'( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 )(1 ) '( )
'( ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
t t t
t t t
t t t
pfU p U p f V z
pfU p U p f V z
V z pU p V z
  (A1.5)  
where 1( 1) 1 1 1 1( ( ), )
d
t t t tR z zp p    , 1 1( ) ( ( ), )dt t t t tz R z zp p . Use the first and the second equations 
to replace '(.)V  in the third equation of (A1.5) to get the system of difference equations of optimal 
compliance rates 
   p p  p p        1 0 1 1 0 1'( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( ) ,t t t tpfU p U p pU p U t
  
(A1.6)  
In a steady state ( , ),o oz R  the accumulated income and compliance rate do not change. 
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The marginal effects of parameters of interest on optimal compliance rates ( )dt tR h z  are derived 
using first order Taylor approximation at a (stable) steady state, ( , )o oz R  
  ( ) ( ) '( )( )o o ot th z h z h z z z      (A1.7)   
B1. Comparative Statics of Steady State Compliance in State 00 
By the equation of motion (see A1.2),  2(1 )o oz R , which together with (A1.6) imply that  
p  p  '( ( ,2 2 )) '( ( )) 0o o oU R R U R       (A1.8)  
where 


         
1 1 (1 )1 0
(1 )
p
p f p
. Let H denote the expression on the left hand side, or  
p  p  '( ( ,2 2 )) '( ( ))H U R R U R     (A1.9)   
Note that there can be no more than one steady state because H(.) is monotonic in R , or  
 t p  p   1(2 3 ) ''( ) ''( ) 0R o oH w f U U      
 
The steady (00) state compliance rate Ro: 
(1) increases with the fine rate f as / /o f RR f H H    , where 
1 2
1 (1 )(.) 3(1 ) ''( ) ( 1) '( ) 0
( )o o
pH w R U U
f p f p
 t p p
 
        >    
 
(2) increases with the audit rate p  as / /
o
p RR p H H     where 
2 2
02 2
[1 (1 )] (1 ) (1 )(.) '( ) 0
( (1 ) ) o
f p pH U
p p f p
   p

      >
    
(3) increases with the tax rate t  as / /o RR H Htt     where 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1 (.) 3(1 ) (2 3 ) ''( ) ''( )
1 (2 3 )(1 ) ''( ) ''( ) 0
o o
o o
H f f R U RU
w
f R U RU
p p
t
p p
        
      >    
(4) increases with income for IARA/CARA preferences as / /o w RR w H H    and  
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   
 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
(.) ''( ) ''( ) '( ) ( ) ( )
'( ) ( ) 0
o o o o o o o o o
o o o o
w H U U U ARA ARA
w
U ARA
p p p p p p p p p
p p p p
     

>  >
 
where the second equality follows from (A1.9). 
(5) increases with the probability of continuation   as / /o RR H H     where 
02
1 ( 1)(1 )(.) (1 ) '( ) 0
( (1 )) o
f pH U
p f p
p
 
     >
  
 
(6) increases with the accumulated unreported income rate z in the neighborhood of the steady 
state. Letting b denote '( )oh z , the first order approximation of the optimal compliance 
function (A1.7) is   ( ) ( )o oh z R b z z . The compliance rate increases in z  if 0b > . To 
find b, replace ( )dt tR h z  in the Euler equation (A1.6), differentiate with respect to tz , 
and evaluate it at the steady state to show that b solves   22 1 0 0a b a b a  (*), where 
 

p p
    > 
          
      
  
"
0 1
" 2 "
1 1 0
" "
2 1 0
" "
1 0
(1 ) 0
(1 )(2 1) (1 )(1 (1 )) 0
(1 ) (1 )
''( ( ,2 )); ''( ( ))o o o
a pf f U
a U pf p p f p p U
a p pfU p U
U U R R U U R
 
For   " "1 0(1 ) 0pfU p U , then the quadratic equation (*) can only have positive solutions. 
For   >" "1 0(1 ) 0pfU p U , it has a positive and a negative solution. Stability conditions for 
(*) (where dtR  converges to 
oR ) are that 1b   , | | 1b b  , and 2| 4 | 2b b b    . The 
negative solution of (*) does not satisfy all these conditions while the positive one does. 
As a result, it must be that '( ) (0,1)oh z b  , so that the optimal compliance rate dtR  
increases in accumulated unreported income rate tz .  
B2.The compliance rate after an audit is smaller than the steady state compliance oR   
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in state 00 (where the individual is not audited in either of the two previous periods). 
Suppose by contradiction that the individual reports wRo after an audit and in state 10. Then 
the individual’s accumulated unreported income is 0, and if not audited again, it is 1 .oR
Therefore the expression in the Euler equation (A1.6) is  
   
p 
 
   
     
      
        0
'( ( ,0) '( ,1 )
(1 )
(1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
(1 ) '( ,2 2 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) '( ) 0
o o o
o o
o o
pfU R pU R R
G p
p U R p U R
f p pU R R p p U R
 
where the inequality follows from concavity of U(.) and the last equality follows from (A1.8). It 
follows from 0G   that Ro is too large to be optimal after an audit.  
 
C. A Myopic Decision-maker. A myopic decision-maker when making a decision on compliance 
rate at time t takes into account the accumulated unreported income but ignores the future effects 
of current compliance rate. Such a decision-maker is a special case of a forward-looking decision-
maker with   0. We show that the optimal compliance rate for myopic decision-makers: 
(1) increases with the accumulated unreported income, and is smallest in state 1 (after an 
audit); 
(2) increases with the fine rate; 
(3) increases with the audit rate; 
(4) increases with the tax rate for CARA and DARA preferences;  
(5) increases with income for CARA and IARA preferences; and 
(6) does not depend on the probability of continuation of the game. 
 
Proof. At any time t, the decision problem of our individual is  
 
 
V ( zt )  maxR[0,1] (1 p)U (p 0(R, zt )) pU (p1(R,zt ))    (A1.10) 
when the accumulated unreported income is  wzt . Differentiating the expression within the square 
brackets with respect to R, we get  
 
1
tw
F(R,t0 )  pfU '(p1(R,zt )) (1 p)U '(p o(R,zt ))  
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The interior optimal compliance rate *R  solves26  
 F(R, )  pfU '(p1(R, zt )) (1 p)U '(p o(R, zt ))  0            (A1.11) 
Note that (as expected) (.) (.)F G  stated in (A1.3).  
It is straightforward to verify that optimal compliance rate mtR : 
(1) increases with accumulated unreported income as  sign(Rz
*)  sign(Fz ), and 
 Fz (.)  U ''(p1t ) > 0 . In state 1, the accumulated unreported income, z takes the smallest 
possible value (0), and by positive monotonicity of * ( )R z , the chosen fraction * (0)R  takes 
its smallest value.  
(2) increases with f  as 
 
sign(Rf
* )  sign(Ff ) , and  Ff (.)  pU '(p 0t ) (z 1 R)wt pfU ''(p1t ) > 0.  
(3) increases with the audit rate p  as  
sign(Rp
* )  sign(Fp ) , where  Fp(.) fU '(p1t ) pU '(p0t )>0 .  
(4) increases with the tax rate t  for CARA and DARA preferences. Verify that
 sign(Rt
*)  sign(Ft ) , and  F(R, )  pfU '(p1(R, zt )) (1 p)U '(p o(R, zt ))  0  
  11 (.) 1 ''( ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 ''( )oF p RU f z f R Uw pf p pt
          
 
 It follows from (A1.11) and the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion that 
 
sign(Ft )  sign A(p 0t )Rt
*  (1 f )(z 1) fRt
*  A(p1t )   
 For CARA preferences or DARA preferences,  A(p 0t ) £ A(p1t )  the expression within the 
square brackets is positive. 
(5) increases with income w for CARA and IARA preferences. Verify that  
 
wF(.)
w
 pfp1tU ''(p1t ) (1 p)p 0tU ''(p 0t )  
                                                     
26 The optimal compliance rate, R* is at the corners, 0 and 1 if  F (0,.)  0  and  F(1,.) > 0 , respectively.  
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 Use similar steps as in the previous to show that  sign(Fw )  sign p1A(p1t )p 0 A(p ot ) . For 
CARA and IARA preferences,  A(p o ) ³ A(p1) , and the expression within the square brackets 
is positive. 
(6) does not depend on the probability of continuation of the game. This follows from the 
optimality condition (A1.11) not depending on    
 
D. A Naive Decision-maker. A naïve decision-maker isolates and does not take into account either 
the accumulated unreported income or the future effects of current decision. The decision problem 
for such a decision-maker is 
 
max
R[0,1]
(1 p)U (p 0(R,0)) pU (p1(R,0)   
The optimal compliance rate R increases in ( f ,p,t CARA/DARA ,wCARA/IARA ) but does not vary with 
previously unreported income, does not depend upon whether an audit took place, and does not 
depend upon with the time of the game. 
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APPENDIX 2: DOUBLE HURDLE PANEL ESTIMATES 
Observations with full compliance account for 58 percent of our data, and full compliance remains 
the mode choice even in state 1 (following audit). Estimation of treatment effects requires that we 
address this aspect of our data. Out of 122 subjects, 30 subjects reported full income in every 
round. One way to think about this is to categorize subjects as “truthful” types (e.g., subjects are 
averse to misreporting, they think of paying taxes as a moral duty) or not; this is the first hurdle. 
In the main text we dealt with this problem by getting Tobit estimates with and without these 
subjects. Here we report double hurdle models that allow for estimating “truthful” types of 
subjects, while at the same time subjects who cleared the “truth” hurdle are allowed to report true 
income at any time if they wish to do so (e.g., when previously unreported income becomes large). 
The first hurdle is a probit equation, and the Tobit equation is estimated only with subjects who 
clear the first hurdle. The double hurdle model allows for differences in the variables that affect 
the different decisions of whether to report all or some of true earned income versus the decision 
on how much to report conditional upon clearing the first hurdle (e.g., deciding to misreport). The 
estimation approach we use here is a double-hurdle panel model (Cragg, 1971; Engel and Moffatt, 
2014).  
 
More precisely, let yi denote the observed compliance rate of individual i (defined as Reported 
Income/True Earned Income) and yi* denote the continuous latent compliance rate that is observed 
only if the subject has elected to misreport income. The model specification is:  
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where Zi and Xit are explanatory variables for the first and the second equations. The first equation 
(for Di) does not depend on task t because a “truthful” type would never report less than full income 
under no circumstances. As a result, in the list of the regressors for the first stage probit equation 
we include only variables that are fixed across rounds, such as the tax rate, the audit rate, the fine 
rate, and gender. Subjects who report true income in round will fail the hurdle. The second equation 
(yit) is a random effects Tobit regression, which allows for choices to depend on the task that differs 
across rounds because of the variation on unreported income from previous rounds. Therefore, we 
add time-varying variables (such as unreported income rate, true earned income, being audited 
last) in the list of regressors.  
 
Appendix Table A.2 reports average marginal effects for the double hurdle panel model, estimated 
using all individual data by round and by treatment. The columns labeled Hurdle present the 
marginal effect on the decision to report True Earned Income; the columns labeled Linear report 
the results for the subject’s Compliance Rate conditional upon the subject misreporting income. 
The impacts of the policy parameters are again largely consistent with the theory and with the 
Tobit estimation results of Table 4 in the main text. For the basic model specification (1), knowing 
that the tax payment goes to charity decreases the probability of clearing the hurdle by 23 percent 
while a one-unit change in the tax rate increases it by almost 87 percent. The signs are consistent 
with Tobit estimates in the first column of Table 4 (which can be seen as the first hurdle that 
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applies to all subjects). Focusing on the linear estimates in Appendix Table A.2, or the estimates 
of individual behavior conditional upon clearing the “hurdle” of choosing some noncompliance, 
compliance increases with an increase in the audit rate, an increase in the fine rate, and with an 
increase in accumulated unreported income; compliance decreases with income. The use of the tax 
payments (or Donation) and the Tax Rate are not statistically significant determinants of the 
individual compliance rate, once the hurdle has been passed. Female decreases the probability of 
clearing the hurdle by 19 percent, but has no effect on compliance rate conditional on passing. 
These estimates are comparable to the Tobit estimates for selected subjects (the 30 subjects not 
included there would have failed the hurdle).  
 
APPENDIX TABLE A.2 
Panel Double Hurdle Model: Average Marginal Effects for Compliance Rate 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Hurdle Linear Hurdle Linear Hurdle Linear 
Donation [D] -0.227*** -0.055 -0.223** -0.068 -0.259*** -0.016 
(0.086) (0.135) (0.089) (0.133) (0.092) (0.138) 
Tax Rate 0.869* 1.233 0.822* 0.961 0.835* 0.926 
(0.498) (0.834) (0.488) (0.610) (0.445) (0.732) 
Fine Rate 0.216 0.527*** 0.205 0.502*** 0.110 0.442** 
(0.259) (0.185) (0.249) (0.174) (0.216) (0.200) 
Audit Rate -0.678 3.500*** -0.714 3.651*** -0.903 3.333** 
(0.920) (0.885) (0.927) (0.841) (0.943) (1.408) 
Accumulated 
Unreport. Income 
Rate 
 0.097***  0.088***  -0.016 
 (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.138) 
Income  -0.080**  -0.055*  0.926 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.732) 
Audited Last Round 
[D] 
   -0.209***  -0.264*** 
   (0.045)  (0.042) 
Accumulated Payoff    -0.004***  -0.004*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Female [D] 
    
-0.190** 
(0.077) 
0.016 
(0.130) 
Observations 2437 2437 2437 
Number of Subjects 122 122 122 
Notes: The dependent variable is Compliance Rate (=Reported Income/Full Income), with a lower bound of 0 and an 
upper bound of 1. The first hurdle is full compliance. The unit of measurement for Income (earned points in the current 
round) as well as Accumulated Payoff (sum of earnings at the beginning of the current round) is 100 EC; dummy 
variables are denoted with [D]; Accumulated Unreported Income Rate is the ratio between the total unreported income 
during the previous two rounds and income in the current round. Standard errors are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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APPENDIX 3: SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 1 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment. 
 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Your earnings will be 
determined by your answers and decisions and the chance of audit*, as described in the 
following instructions. 
 
* In this context, “audit” means that the system can choose you in order to verify if you are 
behaving correctly and telling the truth. 
 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ THESE INTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY. 
 
This experiment is structured in a way that only you can know your earnings. All of the 
money that you earn will be paid to you privately and in cash immediately at the end of 
today’s experiment.  
 
If you have any questions, RAISE YOUR HAND and an experimenter will 
approach you and answer your questions in private. Please feel free to ask 
as many questions as you like. 
 
 
A. Time  
This experiment will last no more than two hours.  
 
B. Show up fee  
You will be paid an amount of 25,000 pesos (USD 13) for showing up for today’s 
experiment. This is in addition to what you will earn from the decisions you make during 
today’s experiment. You will not receive any payment if you decide to leave the experiment 
before it finishes. 
 
C. Earning money during the experiment  
You earn money in Experimental Coins (EC) in each decision period. This amount will be 
displayed on your computer screen at the completion of each decision period. At the end 
of today’s experiment, your total accumulated earnings in Experimental Coins will be 
converted into Colombian Pesos at the below mentioned conversion rate.  
Conversion Rate: 1 Experimental Coin (EC) = 10 Pesos 
 
How to earn money in the experiment? 
 
D. Task and decision-making process 
Beginning 
Each subject will be given an endowment of 500 EC at the beginning of the experiment. 
In this experiment you will have to pass through an indefinite number of decision-making 
periods. Each of the periods has the following sequence of events. 
 
Event 1 
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During each period, each subject is given a work task of adding numbers together in order 
to earn income. You will be given 90 seconds to conduct the task. You will earn 30 
Experimental Coins for each correct answer to an addition question. This income you earn 
will be displayed on your screen at the completion of the task. 
 
Event 2 
Your Earned Income is what you earn in Event 1. You will have to make the choice of how 
much of this Earned Income to report for tax purposes using the sliding scale on your 
computer screen. There is an income tax at rate 30% that you need to pay on the income 
you report. As you move the slide to determine how much income you will report, you can 
see the consequences of your choice in terms of your net income if you are audited or not. 
 
You can choose to report all of your income, part of your income, or none of the income 
earned from the work task in this experiment. Since the income tax rate is 30%, the amount 
of tax you will owe is equal to:  
30% X Reported Income 
 
Event 3 
Once you choose the amount of your Earned Income to report, a random audit will be 
performed. The probability that you will be randomly selected for audit is 10% in each and 
every period, which means that you would be selected for audit about 10 times in 100 
periods. If you are chosen for the random audit in some period, your earned income in that 
period and in the preceding two (2) periods will be disclosed for audit. If the audited 
individual’s reported income is less than the earned income in the current period or any of 
the preceding two (2) periods, then the individual pays, in addition to the tax of 30% of the 
earned income, a fine of 60% of the unpaid tax in the current and two (2) preceding periods.  
 
You pay a tax fine only if you are audited and if your reported income is less than the 
earned income in the current period or any of the 2 preceding periods. 
 
Section E below shows your total payoff in each decision period resulting from Events 1 
to 3 explained above. 
 
E. Earnings in each decision period 
 
Scenario I: If you are not audited 
Total earnings equals Earned Income minus Tax Payment on Reported Income.  
 
Scenario II: If you are audited 
Total earnings equals Earned Income minus Tax Payment on Earned Income minus Fine 
paid on unreported income in the current period and the preceding 2 periods. 
 
(Note: The fine is equal to zero if your Reported Income is equal to your Earned Income 
in every period.) 
 
F. Practice Periods and Real Periods 
Practice Periods: There will be 3 Practice Periods in the experiment. In the Practice 
Periods, the audit results are not randomly selected. You will be audited in the last Practice 
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Period but not in any of the others. No money can be made or lost in the practice periods; 
they are only for practice. 
 
Real Periods: There will be a predetermined number of Real Periods in the experiment. 
Real money, paid in cash at the end of the experiment, can be made and lost in the Real 
Periods. The audit probability is 10% in every Real Period. 
